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NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATIVE
AMERICAN TRIBES TO PURSUE
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL
RESOURCE CLAIMS
BY ALLAN KANNER, RYAN CASEY, AND BARRETT RISTROPH*
ABSTRACT
Native American tribes should take advantage of recent trends in en-
vironmental law to pursue claims for damages to their natural re-
sources and their well-being. This article considers civil actions in
tribal courts, citizen suits, toxic torts, and claims under parens pa-
triae. While tribal regulatory jurisdiction in the environmental arena
has increased, tribal jurisdiction has declined. This has led to an in-
crease in environmental citizen suits, which have enjoyed varying de-
grees of success. Toxic torts have emerged as an alternative to the
traditional route of pursuing claims under federal statutes. Parens
patriae is another unexplored method by which tribes may assume
the same natural resource defense authority that is allocated to states.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Today’s Native American reservations are some of the most
polluted areas of the country.  Reservations do not share in the
wealth of America’s powerful industries, yet bear a disproportionate
amount of its pollution.1  Many tribes have sought legal recourse to
clean up their reservations.  This paper examines different legal
* Allan Kanner, the president of Allan Kanner & Associates, P.L.L.C. has been litigating
environmental and toxic torts for 25 years.  He has collaborated with Ryan Casey and Barrett
Ristroph, colleagues of his New Orleans law firm, to produce this paper.
1. A 1985 Environmental Protection Agency study of 25 reservations found 1200 toxic
waste sites, while another study showed 46% of all Native Americans live near abandoned toxic
waste dumps. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty:
The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1483 (1994). A more recent example is
that of a toxic waste dump on a Native American reservation in New York. Turtles in this area
were “‘so full of PCBs that they [were] considered toxic hazardous waste’ and [had to] be dis-
posed of in toxic hazardous waste dumps.” Neil A.F. Popovic, Pursuing Environmental Justice
with International Human Rights and State Constitutions, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 338, 344 (1996)
(examining World Council of Churches Programme to Combat Racism, Materials for United
Nations Commission on Human Rights Briefing (1995)).
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methods that can be used to clean up pollution on reservations, spe-
cifically through tribal courts, citizen suits, toxic torts, and parens pa-
triae claims. While the federal judiciary has shown an increasing will-
ingness to allow states to sue polluters for damages to natural
resources, Native Americans have yet to follow this course. Using the
model of parens patriae authority allocated to states, Native Ameri-
can tribes should take advantage of their unique autonomy to pursue
toxic tort and natural resource damage claims.
II.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL STATE OF
NATIVE AMERICAN RESERVATIONS
In recent years, Indian Country2 has increasingly become home
to hazardous waste sites, including those for nuclear waste.3 Multiple
factors have precipitated this condition.  First, the financial situation
and political disenfranchisement of Native Americans make them
particularly vulnerable candidates for exploitation.  Second, the envi-
ronment is a relatively new concern for Native American activists.
Finally, the confusion surrounding the applicability of environmental
regulations to Indian reservations creates a fog in which some pollut-
ers can escape notice.
A.  Exploitation
Polluters are attracted to Indian reservations for the same reason
they are attracted to minority communities in the southeast–poverty,
political disenfranchisement, and the resulting potential for exploita-
tion.4  Because of the dire economic situation on many reservations,5
tribal members are not in a strong position to refuse a polluter’s fi-
nancial offer, no matter what the long-term health consequences may
be.  Tribes who do protect their environmental rights often find them-
selves in a weak position to politically challenge the polluter.6 Fur-
2. “Indian country” is a jurisdictional term of art that encompasses all lands within reser-
vation boundaries, dependent Indian communities, and all Indian allotments.  See 18 U.S.C. §
1151 (2000).
3. Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: A Paradoxical
Trade, 12 LAW & INEQ. 267 (1994).
4. See generally, Hillary Gross, et al., Environmental Justice: A Review of State Responses,
8 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 41 (2001).
5. Sheila Foster, Justice from the Ground Up: Distributive Inequities, Grassroots Resis-
tance, and the Transformative Politics of the Environmental Justice Movement, 86 CAL. L. REV.
775, 805 (1998).
6. Richard A. Du Bey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous
Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449, 450 (1988).
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ther, they experience cognitive dissonance between their desires to
maintain traditional environmental values and to pursue a path of
self-determination with regard to economic development.7
Because the issue of a clean environment is often framed as be-
ing in conflict with economic success, many tribes have viewed envi-
ronmental action as something beyond their reach.8  A tribe with high
unemployment cannot afford to turn down economic opportunities,
regardless of their consequences.  Polluters understand this fact and
seize upon it.  Tribal governments welcome what they see as an op-
portunity for economic self-sufficiency, including full employment of
tribal members and investment capital for future projects.9
For the tribes who seek redress against a polluter, a lack of re-
sources adversely affects political mobilization against the offender.
As one scholar noted, “The companies and even the agencies which
regulate their operation have allowed such siting because communi-
ties of color are lacking in resources such as financial or political or-
ganizations to defeat them.”10 
B.  Environmentalism as a Relatively New Concern
For advocates of Native American sovereignty, environmental-
ism is a relatively new concern.  Native American activists in the
1960s viewed environmentalists with skepticism.11  Environmentalists
appeared to be promoting issues that essentially detracted from what
7. In a letter to the members of the Mescalero Apache tribe, Wendell Chino, tribal presi-
dent for the past three decades, said the tribal council believed that income from the repository
“could provide an opportunity for long-term independence and prosperity for our tribe that we
would be negligent to ignore or reject.” Matthew L. Wald, Tribe on Path to Nuclear Waste Site,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1993, at A12. Another Mescalero tribe member had a different view: “We
are once again . . . put in that position of being guinea pigs for the U.S. government and I don’t
like it. . . . If it was so safe, why don’t they put it in their backyard instead of trying to shove it off
on us?” All Things Considered: New Mexico Considers Nuclear Waste Site Nearby (NAT’L
PUB. RADIO broadcast, Aug. 29, 1993) (quoting tribal member Donna Lynn Torres).  See also
Louis G. Leonard, Comment Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environmental Justice in the
Mescalero Apache’s Decision to Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 651, 681
(1997); Sandi B. Zellmer, Article, Indian Lands as Critical Habitat for Indian Nations and En-
dangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L. REV. 381 (1998) (dis-
cussing conflict between tribal priorities and the Endangered Species Act ).
8. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Challenge Of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 277, 311 (1993).
9. Foster, supra note 6, at 805.
10. Joseph Hill, Human Rights, Environment, & Community: A Workshop held at Buffalo
Law School, 4 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 117 (1998).
11. Peter M. Manus, The Owl, The Indian, The Feminist, And The Brother: Environmen-
talism Encounters The Social Justice Movements, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 249 (1996).
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was considered the real issue for Native Americans: the white man’s
racism and the resulting paternalism of the state.12 These Na-
tive-American advocates resisted efforts to force their struggles into a
narrow distributive paradigm of environmental racism, focusing in-
stead on their tribes’ ability to exercise their unique sovereignty.13
They viewed the positions advocated by environmentalists as a mani-
festation of their lack of sovereignty problem, and not as a solution to
an impending health crisis.14
One example of this line of thinking is seen in the Campo Band
of Mission Indians’ 1994 initiative to locate a large waste facility on
their reservation.15  Faced with environmental protests and pressure
from outside advocacy groups, the tribal leaders refused to allow en-
vironmentalists to prevent the siting. They were intent upon defeating
the “paternalistic” and “racist” assumption that “if an Indian com-
munity decides to accept such a project, it either does not understand
the potential consequences or has been bamboozled by an unprinci-
pled waste company.”16  These Native Americans rejected the thought
pattern of environmental groups that “that Indians lack the intelli-
gence to balance and protect adequately their own economic and en-
vironmental interests.”17  Environmental advocacy was yet another
example of the white man’s paternalistic attitude which had all but
eradicated Native Americans over the years.18 The tribe’s victory in
obtaining the siting reflects the failure of the environmental move-
ment to adequately consider the element of sovereignty in environ-
mental justice.
C.  Confusion Surrounding Environmental Regulatory Authority
Indian reservations hold a unique place in American federalism.
The federal and state governments have had difficulty trying to bal-
ance public policy goals with the sovereignty promised to Native
Americans.19  In the spirit of granting tribes more control over their
12. Id.
13. Foster, supra note 6, at 805.
14. Id. at 806.
15. Ken Gover & Jane L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribe’s Ap-
proach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV 933, 938 (1992) (quoting the tribe’s General Council).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Heather A. Weckbaugh, Tenth Circuit Surveys: Federal Indian Law, 76 DENV. U. L.
REV. 845, 875 (1999).
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land, the EPA developed a policy20 in 1984 by which tribes have
authority over “reservation lands” and the “reservation populace.”
Congress followed suit, amending many of the major environmental
acts to allow tribes to receive state treatment.21  Unlike states, how-
ever, areas considered Indian Country encompass relatively small
pieces of land enclosed within states.22 The existence of a separate In-
dian sovereignty in environmental regulation is problematic, as the
actions within the small area affect the non-tribal members outside
the reservation (and vice-versa).23 While in some cases, more strict
Indian regulations have been the source of discord between tribes and
states, it is more often the case that Indian laws are less strict.24  Com-
panies have seized upon these variances to take advantage of the
most lax law in a given area.25 The federal government has also been a
culprit both in causing inadequate protections on reservations, and in
taking advantage of the more lax standards.26
20. Environmental Protection Agency, Policy for the Administration of Environmental
Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984), available at http://www.epa.gov/indian/1984;
see also Washington Dep’t of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1471 (4th Cir. 1985).
21. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) § 1451, Pub. L. No. 99- 339, 100 Stat. 665
(passed in 1986, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (2000)). The Clean Water Act
(CWA) § 518, Pub. L. No. 100- 4, 101 Stat. 76 (passed in 1987, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377 (2000)). The Clean Air Act (CAA) § 164, Pub. L. No. 101- 549, 104 Stat. 2399 (amended
in 1990 to allow tribal regulation of air quality on reservations, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7474 (2000)). The CWA, the SDWA, and the CAA all authorize EPA to promulgate regula-
tions specifying how the EPA will treat tribes in the same manner in which it treats states.
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000).
23. Janet K. Baker, Tribal Water Quality Standards: Are There Any Limits?, 7 DUKE
ENVTL. L & POL’Y F. 367, 367 (Spring 1997).
24. Bill Lambrecht, Illegal Dumpers Scar Indian Land . . . Indifference Endangers Reserva-
tions, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH 11A (Nov. 17, 1991) (detailing how a member of the
Onondaga Tribe let a sandblaster  deposit tons of granular lead-filled material on his land for
$50 when the sandblaster would otherwise have had to pay $25,000 to properly bury the waste in
a landfill); Larry B. Stammer and Louis Sahagun, Profits vs. Toxics; Indian Land Opening to
City Wastes, L.A. TIMES 1 (Sept. 26, 1987) (describing a garbage hauler in California who
dumped twenty tons of waste on a tribal reservation for only $75, but would have had to pay
$1,600 to deposit it at a state-regulated dump); Ralph Frammolino and Amy Wallace, Landfill
Lease on Indian Land Has Substandard Controls, L.A. TIMES B1 (April 14, 1991) (describing
how a Pittsburgh waste disposal company negotiated with a California tribe to build a dump on
the tribe’s land that the state would have denied outside of the reservation).
25. See, e.g., Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 921 (1998)
(non-Indian industries were discharging pollutants from non-Indian fee land that affected the
Kootenai and Salish Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation).
26. While the EPA has a policy of “promot[ing] an enhanced role for tribal government in
relevant decisionmaking and implementation of Federal environmental programs on Indian res-
ervations,” EPA Policy for Program Implementation on Indian Lands (Dec. 19, 1980), quoted in
State of Washington, Dep’t of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1985),  the agency
recognizes that “[i]n general, EPA programs have not been effectively applied on Indian reser-
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Confusion also stems from the fact that different environmental
laws accord the tribes with different degrees of power. While the
Clean Water Act (CWA), the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),
and the Clean Air Act (CAA) treat tribes as states for environmental
regulatory purposes, the CWA27 and SDWA28 have not been consid-
ered “delegations” of federal authority whereby a tribe could extend
its authority to non-members.29  The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),30 on the
other hand, does not treat tribes as states, although they are given
many of the same powers.31 CERCLA treats tribes differently than
states by waiving, for remedial actions on tribal lands, requirements
that apply to such actions within states.32 However, tribes are not as-
sured of having at least one site within their jurisdiction included on
vations.” Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Certain Independent Agencies
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1987: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Independent
Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, Part 2, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 806 (1986) at
815. In some occasions, the EPA has been unwilling to request adequate funding for Indian
programs. See, e.g., Department of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies
Appropriations for 1988: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on HUD-Independent Agencies of the
House Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 675 (1987) (EPA failed to request the
funds necessary to conduct surveys of reservation pollution problems as called for in statutes).
See Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Article, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: A Paradoxical
Trade, 12 LAW & INEQ. 267, 297 (1994) (discussing the federal government’s nuclear develop-
ment scheme and performed pursuant to leases entered into by the Bureau of Indian Affairs:
“In exchange for the income generated by the tribe’s natural resources, Native Americans re-
ceived a legacy of cancer, death, and pollution.”)
27. See, e.g., 54 Fed. Reg. 39101 (1989) (Water Quality Standards (WQS) proposal stating
that “Clean Water Act authorizes use of existing tribal authority . . . but it does not grant addi-
tional authority to Tribes.”).
28. See 52 Fed. Reg. 28111, 28113 (1987) (proposal for SDWA Indian regulations, stating
that a tribe must have its own authorities to operate the program: “EPA does not delegate its
own authority. Nothing in this proposal is intended to alter any pre-existing authority or immu-
nity any Indian tribe may have by way of third parties.”).
29. Nevertheless, if a tribe can demonstrate inherent authority over on-reservation water
resources for waters that lie within the reservation’s exterior borders, under the guidelines es-
tablished in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), it acts under federal authority. See
WILLIAM P. YELLOWTAIL, REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR FOR EPA REGION 8, DECISION
DOCUMENT: APPROVAL OF CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES APPLICATION
FOR TREATMENT AS A STATE UNDER SECTION 303 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (Feb. 27,
1995). But see Yankton Sioux Tribe v. S. Miss. Waste Mgmt. Dist. 890 F. Supp. 878, 879 (D.S.D.
1995) (holding that although Yankton Sioux Reservation was not diminished by 1892 agreement
providing for sale of surplus lands, the tribe nevertheless failed to establish jurisdiction over
solid waste landfill under the Montana test).
30. CERCLA § 126, 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2000).
31. CERCLA § 126, 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2000).
32. These requirements involve payment of a share of the costs of remedial actions, assur-
ance of future maintenance of a remedy, and assurance that a suitable facility is available for
disposing of the wastes at the site. CERCLA § 104(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (2000).
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the national priorities list for remedial action.33 Further, under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which sets
minimum guidelines and standards for the disposal of hazardous and
solid wastes, there is no provision for solid waste regulation on Indian
lands that do not exercise independent means and regulate them-
selves.34
III.  CURRENT LEGAL METHODS IN ADDRESSING
POLLUTED RESERVATIONS
There are three dominant methods that can be used in court to
address pollution on reservations.  Claims may be brought in tribal
courts, in federal courts under the citizen suit provisions of federal
environmental regulations, or as toxic tort actions.
A.  Indian Court Jurisdiction
While in recent years federal environmental acts have expanded
the power of tribes to control natural resources and pollution within
their boundaries,35 federal jurisprudence has narrowed the tribal judi-
cial power necessary to make tribal authority a reality. In theory, a
tribal court controls where there is personal jurisdiction over the liti-
gants (based on the tribal constitution), territorial jurisdiction (based
on the relation of the events of the case to Indian Country), and sub-
ject matter jurisdiction (which may be exclusive or concurrent with
the state or the federal courts).36  In the last 50 years, however, tribal
court authority has significantly eroded. First, tribes are less likely to
have jurisdiction over a case.37 Second, litigants are often not required
to exhaust their remedies in a tribal court system before proceeding
to a state or federal court.38 Third, there is no prescribed method by
33. 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2000).
34. Foster, supra note 6, at 805, n.123. See also Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA, 100
F.3d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that Native American tribes are not states under RCRA).
35. Environmental Protection Agency, Policy for the Administration of Environmental
Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984), available at http://www.epa.gov/indian/1984;
see also Washington Dep’t of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1471 (4th Cir. 1985).
36. An example of tribal-state concurrent jurisdiction is a divorce proceeding in which one
spouse is a tribal member domiciled on the reservation and the other spouse is domiciled off the
reservation. Either the state or the tribal court could hear such a matter.  Nancy Thorington,
Article, Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction over Matters Arising in Indian Country: A Roadmap for
Improving Interaction Among Tribal, State and Federal Governments, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV.
973, 989 (2000).
37. Id. at 1036.
38. Id. at 1035.
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which state or federal courts must honor a tribal judgment.39 This is
typically left to the discretion of the state, which may or may not have
legislation in place to recognize these judgments.40
1.  Jurisdiction
Montana v. United States 41 severely restricted tribal jurisdiction,
establishing a presumption against the tribal regulation of
non-Indians in the absence of some factor that would directly affect
the health and welfare of the tribe.42  In Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 43
the Supreme Court held that tribal courts could not exercise jurisdic-
tion over a non-member where an accident occurred on a public
highway maintained by the State pursuant to a federally granted
right-of-way over Indian reservation land.44 These cases suggest a pre-
sumption against tribal authority over non-Indian activities. In Atkin-
son Trading Co. v. Shirley45 and Nevada v. Hicks,46 the Supreme Court
made clear that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians exists only in very
limited contexts. The sum of the two cases appears to be that tribes
can be certain of such jurisdiction only when non-Indians enter into
consensual relationships with tribes.
2.  Exhaustion
Additionally, exhaustion is not necessary when federal courts
have jurisdiction via a federal question.  This occurs when a federal
environmental law is involved, such as RCRA47 or the Price Anderson
Act.48  Such was the case in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, in
which the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed a Ninth Circuit
ruling that required the non-Native American defendants in two ra-
diation exposure suits to first pursue all remedies in Navajo Nation
tribal courts before their case could advance to the federal court sys-
tem.49
39. Id. at 1036.
40. Id.
41. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
42. See id. at 563-565.
43. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
44. Id. at 459.
45. 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
46. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
47. Blue Legs v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1098 (8th Cir.
1989).
48. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473 (1999).
49. Id.
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3.  Credit
Indian court judgments have been given credit in some courts
under principles of comity50 or by analogy to state judgments under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.51 Many courts, however, have
viewed the question of enforceability as a federal question that must
be reviewed by a federal court.52 The Supreme Court’s willingness to
uphold decisions that nullify the final judgment of an Indian tribe’s
highest courts (based on subject matter jurisdiction)53 suggests that an
Indian court judgment can be relatively easily displaced.
B.  Environmental Citizen Suits
Rather than pursuing environmental action in tribal courts, most
environmentalists and concerned Native American groups have
turned to federal courts.54 While there are a variety of methods under
which to pursue action, citizen suits are among the most effective.
Twelve federal environmental acts enable private action in the form
of citizen suits.55 There are two basic kinds of “citizen suits” in envi-
50. See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir.1998). States that practice com-
ity with Indian judgments include Arizona (Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1977)), Minnesota (Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)), Mon-
tana (Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512 (Mont. 1982)), North Dakota (Fredericks v. Eide
Kirschmann Ford, 462 N.W. 2d 164 (N.D. 1990)), South Dakota (One Feather v. O.S.T. Pub.
Safety Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 48 (S.D. 1992)), Oregon (In re Matter of Red Fox, 542 P.2d 918
(Or. Ct. App. 1975)), and Wisconsin (Sengstock v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 477 N.W.2d 310
(Wis. Ct. App. 1991)). Interestingly, North Dakota is listed as a state that practices “comity”
with Tribal Court judgments, yet has a statute that is closer to Full Faith and Credit. See gener-
ally, N.D. Cent. Code § 27-01-09 (1995).
51. See Iron Crow v. Ogallala Sioux Tribe, 129 F. Supp. 15, 21 (W.D. S.D. 1955).
52. See also Swift Transp. Inc. v. John, 546 F. Supp. 1185 (D. Ariz. 1982) (granting defen-
dant declaratory and injunctive relief against Indian officials who asserted jurisdiction over a
claim arising from an automobile accident on a U.S. highway that passed through the Navajo
Indian Reservation; in addition, holding that whether the Navajo Indian Tribal Court had juris-
diction over the non-Indian plaintiff presented a federal question within the ambit of 28 U.S.C.
1331); United Nuclear Corp. v. Clark, 584 F. Supp. 107 (D. D.C. 1984); UNC Res., Inc. v.
Benally, 514 F. Supp. 358, 359-61 (D. N.M. 1981) (granting federal question jurisdiction; “[t]he
power to try and to assess civil penalties is the power to invade other liberties which the United
States has an interest in protecting for its citizens against ‘unwarranted intrusions’ was a consid-
eration reserved for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian tribes should finally be
authorized to try non-Indians.” [Internal quotations deleted.]).
53. See e.g., Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
54. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733 (D. N.M. 1993); Atl. States Legal
Found., Inc. v. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d 235 (N.D. N.Y. 2001); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of
Florida v. United States, 105 F.3d 599 (11th Cir. 1997).
55. Citizen suits appear in at least 12 separate environmental laws: CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. §
7604 (2000), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000), the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2000), the
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ronmental law: (1) suits by private citizens against other private citi-
zens alleged to be violating a federal environmental law, and (2) suits
by private citizens against the executive branch of the federal gov-
ernment, usually the EPA, alleging that the government has not car-
ried out a mandatory duty in implementing an environmental law.
Citizen suits involving Native Americans seem to arise most fre-
quently under the CWA. One example is City of Albuquerque v.
Browner,56 in which the Isleta Pueblo successfully petitioned the EPA
for challenging “treatment as a state” under the CWA.  The city of
Albuquerque filed suit, claiming that the high water quality standards
set by the Pueblo would cost the upstream Albuquerque $250 million
to upgrade its water treatment facilities. The federal district court re-
jected the city’s challenge and acknowledged the Native Americans’
right to control their natural resources.57
Not all cases have been so easy, however, giving the complex le-
gal schema in which tribes share with cities and states the power to
implement environmental controls. In Atlantic States Legal Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Hamelin,58 environmental groups and a Native American
community organization brought a citizen suit alleging that the land-
owner violated the CWA by discharging dirt and gravel into a thriv-
ing wetland on the Native American Reservation. The district court
held that the organizations had standing59 but that plaintiffs could not
claim civil penalties because the Native American tribe had already
taken action against the polluter.60 Since the EPA had refrained from
taking action (allowing the tribe to proceed with its counsel), the
court found that the tribe was acting like a “state.” This constituted
“diligent prosecution” for purposes of CWA section barring citizen
suits.61  However, even though the civil penalties claim was dismissed,
plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were not dis-
missed on the same basis.62
Noise Control Act (NCA), § 12, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (2000), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), §
11(g), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2000), the DPA, 33 U.S.C. § 1515 (2000), RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. §
6972 (2000), SDWA § 1449, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000), the Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act (SMCRA), § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (2000), CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2000), the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), § 326. 42 U.S.C. § 11046
(2000), and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a) (2000).
56. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733.
57. Id. at 742.
58. Hamelin, 182 F. Supp. 2d. 235.
59. Id. at 240.
60. Id. at 247.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 248.
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In Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States, 63 the
tribe alleged that the EPA failed to comply with its duties under the
CWA by not reviewing Florida’s water quality standards that had re-
cently been adopted in the Everglades Forever Act (EFA). The stan-
dards allegedly violated the anti-degradation requirements imposed
by the CWA. The district court dismissed the tribe’s suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the Administrator had no duty
to review Florida’s water quality standards under the EFA because
Florida never submitted these standards to the Administrator for re-
view.64 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court
inappropriately relied on Florida’s representations that the EFA did
not change Florida’s water quality standards.65 The court further
noted that, regardless of whether a state fails to submit new or revised
standards, an actual change in its water quality standards could in-
voke the mandatory duty imposed on the Administrator of the EPA
to review such new or revised standards.66 The court concluded by
stating that the CWA citizen suit jurisdiction depended on whether
the EFA actually changed Florida’s water quality standards.67 The
tribe’s claim was remanded for determination of that issue.
Tribal action under CERCLA has become more common since
amendments to that statute have added Indian tribes as authorized
trustees.68 The prominence of CERCLA and RCRA actions may in-
crease as tribes deal with waste facilities that have been sited on their
land. This issue becomes complicated, however, when members of the
tribe itself are responsible for the waste facility. Blue Legs v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency,69 involving the solid waste
provisions of RCRA, illustrates this situation. The Ogallala Sioux
tribe operated several open dumps on the Pine Ridge Reservation.
The plaintiffs, who were members of the tribe, brought suit under
RCRA’s citizens’ suit provisions against the tribe, the Bureau of In-
63. 105 F.3d 599 (11th Cir. 1997).
64. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fl. v. United States, No. 95-0533 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
65. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fl., 105 F.3d at 602.
66. Id. at 602.
67. Id. at 603.
68. Trustees representing an Indian tribe are appointed in order to sue polluters to recover
damages for “injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable
costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.” 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(C); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).  See also 42 U.S.C. 9626 (1994) (providing that a tribal gov-
ernment “shall be afforded substantially the same treatment as a State” including notification of
releases, consultation on remedial actions, access to information, roles and responsibilities un-
der the national contingency plan, and submittal of priorities for remedial action). 
69. 668 F. Supp. 1329 (D. S.D. 1987).
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dian Affairs (BIA), the Indian Health Service (IHS), and EPA for
violations of RCRA’s open dump prohibitions.
The federal district court noted that EPA’s authority under
RCRA was not the same for hazardous as for solid waste.70 While the
statute gave EPA direct regulatory authority over hazardous waste, it
merely authorized the agency to provide technical and management
assistance to states for the development of management plans for
solid waste. Therefore, the court granted EPA’s motion for summary
judgment.71 On the other hand, the court held that the tribe has the
responsibility, stemming from its inherent sovereignty, to regulate,
operate, and maintain landfills on the reservation.72 Accordingly, the
tribe was ordered to bring the dumps into compliance with RCRA.
The BIA and the IHS were also made subject to the court’s order, be-
cause the two agencies were using the tribe’s open dumps for solid
waste generated by them and their personnel.73
By taking advantage of environmental citizen suit provisions in
federal acts, Native American plaintiffs in these cases were able to as-
sert authority in the environmental arena. Thus, citizen suits were a
good way to enhance tribal environmental authority already based in
the same federal acts. This authority appears to be much stronger
than that based on more traditional theories of liability such as sover-
eignty or treaties.
However, there are two drawbacks of citizen suits that have lim-
ited complete recovery in these and other situations. The first is the
difficulty in obtaining standing to sue. A plaintiff must demonstrate
actual or likely harm to the plaintiff or the environment–speculative
or possible harm is not enough. The alleged injury must be both “cer-
tain and great,” not merely “serious and substantial.”74 A serious
threat of injury may be sufficient, but the danger must also be immi-
nent. Recent Supreme Court cases suggest that there is a high bar for
asserting that one is affected by a given environmental injury.75 Sec-
ond, citizen suits do not include toxic tort actions for personal injury
70. Id. at 1339.
71. Id. at 1340-1341.
72. Id. at 1341.
73. Id.
74. Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1250 (10th Cir. 2001).
75. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). See also In re Southdown, Inc., Litig. No. C-3-93-270, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6220
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2000).
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or property damage. They also do not include private suits for the
personal losses suffered when public resources are damaged.76
C.  Toxic Torts
Toxic torts are environmental claims brought under traditional
common law theories such as nuisance and trespass. They are a rela-
tively under-pursued way to address environmental problems in In-
dian country.77 Not only are there abundant cases of environmental
damages to be remedied, there are a number of common law theories
that could be used to address them.  Compared to tribal courts and
citizens suits, toxic torts are a more effective way to sue for environ-
mental damages to property and person because complex environ-
mental issues can be simplified under a toxic tort claim, making for
more effective litigation.
Toxic tort litigation has evolved since its debut in the late 1970s
with the accidents at Love Canal and the Three Mile Island nuclear
plant. Courts have addressed the problems of statutes of limitations,78
causation,79 and case management.80 Public law models have begun to
impact private law toxic tort cases, especially civil procedure and evi-
dence law. Toxic tort class actions offer an attractive method for ad-
76. Fishers can sue for damages in private action, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d
558 (9th Cir. 1974) (suit by commercial fishermen against oil companies for damages allegedly
sustained as a result of an oil spill); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170
(E.D. La. 1981) (suit by commercial fishermen to recover damages for closing of fishing grounds
due to contamination by PCB after collision of ships), and they may also sue under the CWA
pursuant to Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 16
(1981):
[C]itizen-suit provisions apply . . .[to] both plaintiffs seeking to enforce these statutes
as private attorneys general, whose injuries are “non-economic” and probably non-
compensable, and persons like respondents who assert that they have suffered tangible
economic injuries because of statutory violations.
However, citizen suits do not allow for private individuals to collect personal damages (in con-
trast to qui tam “whistle blower” suits). Rather, they allow recovery of costs for the suit, e.g.,
Clean Water Act § 505(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (providing for the recovery of attorney’s fees and
costs to “any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court determines such
award is appropriate”), and the application of civil penalties to public projects, e.g. Section
304(g)(2) of the Clean Air Act specifically allows up to $ 100,000 of any civil penalty to be used
in “beneficial mitigation projects.” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(g)(2).
77. A quick search of Lexis or Westlaw shows that, relative to the number of suits that are
pursued as citizen suits, the extent to which toxic torts are brought for pollution and natural re-
source damage in Indian Country is very small.
78. See e.g., Jones v. Chemetron Corp., 212 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2000).
79. See e.g., DiPetrillo v. Dow Chem. Co., 729 A.2d 677 (R.I. 1999).
80. See Francis McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 595 (1997).
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dressing a circumstance in which many people are damaged.81 They
also provide a method for addressing the delayed manifestation of an
injury for large groups of people via medical monitoring or compen-
sation for increased risk of disease.82
The most popular causes of action in toxic tort cases include
strict liability, negligence/failure to warn, emotional distress, medical
monitoring, nuisance, trespass, and breach of contract.
1.  Strict liability
Strict liability remains the default choice in many toxic tort cases.
Strict liability describes a set of legal concepts which hold one party
responsible for damages caused to another without any showing that
the liable party is “at fault’’ in causing the damages.83 The most rele-
vant applications for Native Americans may be non-natural and haz-
ardous uses of land. This arises when a landowner or occupier brings
on the land something that is not a matter of natural usage and that
escapes, causing injury to the land, person or property of his neigh-
bor. The party is strictly liable, irrespective of all acts of due care.84 A
similar theory that might apply in the case of toxic waste that has
leached into the water of Indian Country is strict liability for abnor-
mally dangerous activities (as provided for in the Second Restate-
ment).85  Given the risks involved with toxic wastes or transporting
oil, harm to Native Americans in the adjacent areas could be foresee-
able (a necessary element of strict liability).86
81. See e.g., Butler v. Carolina Nat’l Transp. Co., No. 00-3095, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1445
(E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2001); Valencia v. Sung M. Lee, 123 F. Supp. 2d 666 (E.D. N.Y. 2000).
82. See Foust v. SEPTA, 756 A.2d 112 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
83. Similar to a cause of action in negligence, the injured party must prove that the defen-
dant proximately caused an injury.  See e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., No. 86-6087, 1988
U.S. App. LEXIS 6957 (6th Cir. May 24, 1988).
84. Many states have applied strict liability to hazardous waste that causes injury to sur-
rounding property. Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Ct. App. 1975). See Ashland
Oil, Inc. v. Miller Oil Purchasing Co., 678 F.2d 1293, 1308 (5th Cir. 1982); State Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J.1983); Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil, Inc., 369 A.2d 49 (N.J.
Super. 1976); McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 467 P.2d 635 (Or. 1970); Langan v. Vali-
copters, Inc., 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977). See also Schwartzman, Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
842 F. Supp. 475, 479 (D.N.M. 1993):
The common law of strict liability has changed in response to changing conditions in
American society. The storage and disposal of toxic chemical waste poses the same
threat to health and welfare today as the detonation of dynamite and impoundment of
waters posed in years past. The Court finds that strict liability in New Mexico is not
confined to blasting, and that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts supporting a charac-
terization of Defendant’s hazardous waste activities as abnormally dangerous.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977).
86. See, e.g., James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898 (N.J. 1998).
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An interesting case that has arisen in the context of radiation in-
volves Native Americans damaged by releases from the feder-
ally-owned Hanford Nuclear Facility in south central Washington
State.  At least one hundred and fifty individual Native Americans
from five tribes living in the vicinity are suing several federal govern-
ment agencies and contractors for damages resulting from wrongful
human radiation experimentation based on intentional and uninten-
tional releases of harmful radioactive materials from the various re-
search projects conducted at Hanford.87
Attorneys for the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington on April
2, 2003 for violations of the constitutional rights of the indigenous
group under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, for infliction of radiological inju-
ries compensable under 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Price Anderson Act), civil
conspiracy, battery, strict liability, negligence and other torts.88 Plain-
tiffs allege that the defendants have released radioactive substances
into the environment since the opening of Hanford in 1943 as a nu-
clear weapons research facility and reprocessing plant.89
Plaintiffs seek damages not only for the potential harm from ex-
ternal exposure, but also the harm to their traditional culture, diet,
and lifestyle. The risk of health damage is relatively higher for Native
Americans in the area, as they digest greater quantities of native
vegetation, fish and game than other Americans.90 Already, thousands
of residents from the region for many years have experienced symp-
toms related to ingestion and exposure to radioactive byproducts.
87. Native American Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against U.S. Government and Contractors
For Human Radiation Experimentation At Hanford Nuclear Facility, at
http://www.ncai.org/main/pages/issues/natural_resources/
documents/NWradex.htm (last visited June 15, 2003) (hereinafter Hanford Lawsuit).
88. The class of injured persons could grow to tens of thousands of people. At this time, the
plaintiffs are tribal members from the Colville, Nez Perce, Umatilla, Warm Springs, and Ya-
kama Indian Reservations. In addition to the Department of Energy and its predecessor agen-
cies, and the Department of Defense, defendants include Battelle Pacific Northwest Laborato-
ries, Westinghouse, General Electric, Rockwell International, DuPont, and University of
Washington.  Id.
89. The Hanford Site is home to nine production reactors and four chemical separation
plants. Id.
90. Id.  See also NRDC v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993) (in which the court deferred to
the EPA’s approval of Maryland and Virginia’s water quality criteria for dioxin that were based
on scientifically defensible methods, despite the fact that the criteria were less protective than
the EPA’s recommended criterion and despite the appellants argument that “the risk is espe-
cially high for the Mattaponi and Native American people who live near a major paper mill in
Virginia and who, it is argued, consume higher-than-average amounts of fish.”).
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Health maladies include thyroid and bone cancers, arthritis, diabetes,
blood and reproductive disorders, and autoimmune disorders.91
2.  Negligence/Failure to Warn
In general, an individual is held liable in negligence for failing to
act as a reasonable and prudent person would act under the same or
similar circumstances. In the area of environmental torts, the follow-
ing duties may be recognized:
(i) Duties to manage, store, protect, and isolate hazardous or
toxic materials in a reasonable manner,
(ii) Duties to truthfully advise, inform, and warn of dangers
associated with the hazardous materials, and
(iii) Duties of non-negligent supervision of an independent
contractor handling, storing, treating, or disposing of haz-
ardous materials.92
Breach of the duty to warn is probably the standard of care relied
upon most frequently in toxic tort cases. It is common to the theories
of negligence, warranty, strict liability, and misrepresentation.93 This
line of reasoning is particularly appropriate for actions in which Na-
tive Americans as a group have been exposed to dangerous condi-
tions without being warned, as in the Hanford case above.94
3.  Emotional Distress
Negligent infliction of emotional distress is a new concept in
toxic tort cases, and has yet to gain acceptance in most jurisdictions.95
In those jurisdictions that do allow compensation for negligent inflic-
91. Hanford Lawsuit, supra note 87.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416, 427, 427a, 427b (1965).
93. According to the Second Restatement of Torts, liability for failure to warn arises when
the manufacturer or supplier  (i) knew or had reason to know that the product is or is likely to
be dangerous for the use for which it is intended,
(ii) had no reason to believe that those who use the product would have realized its dangerous
condition, and (iii) failed to exercise reasonable care to inform the user of its dangerous condi-
tion or of the facts, which made it likely to be dangerous. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
388 (1965).
94. A similar instance involves a study of the effect of uranium radiation exposure on the
health of miners, conducted by the Public Health Service in 1949. The majority of the miners
who participated in the study were Native American. The miners were never warned of the
dangers inherent in radiation exposure. Further, despite their voluntary participation in the
study, no safety measures were instituted. See Medora Marisseau, Seeing Through The Fallout:
Radiation and The Discretionary Function Exception, 22 ENVTL. L. 1509 (1992).
95. See McClenathan v. Rhone-Poulenc Inc., 926 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (S.D. W.Va. 1996)
(suggesting that plaintiffs could prevail on a theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress
but not on negligence).
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tion, usually some physical injury or threat of serious physical injury
must accompany the emotional distress.96 “Where no physical injury
has manifested, it is not clear whether subclinical and subcellular lev-
els of changes constitute physical injury to which emotional distress
damages may attach.”97 In one toxic tort case, damage to the immune
system caused by a change to the bone marrow was deemed to consti-
tute physical harm sufficient to support a cause of action for personal
injury.98 Some courts do allow for recovery in the absence of injury if
the plaintiff demonstrates sufficient evidence of a non-physical injury,
such as fear of acquiring cancer.99
In Collier v. Simpson Paper Co.,100  the Ninth Circuit provided a
guideline for such a claim. To establish tortious inducement of fear of
contracting cancer given the absence of physical injury or illness, ap-
pellants may only recover for fear of contracting cancer if:
(i) Due to appellee’s negligence, appellants were exposed to
a toxic, cancer-causing substance; and
(ii) Appellants fear cancer based on the knowledge, corrobo-
rated by reliable medical or scientific opinion, that it is
96. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993); Robinson v. United
States, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
97. Conrad G. Tuohey & Ferdinand V. Gonzalez, Emotional Distress Issues Raised by the
Release of Toxic and Other Hazardous Materials, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 661, 697 (2001). See
Firestone, 863 P.2d at 809 n.10 (Cal. 1993) (“No California cases address whether impairment of
the immune system response and cellular damage constitute “physical injury’ sufficient to allow
recovery for parasitic emotional distress.”).
98. Duarte v. Zachariah, 22 Cal. App. 4th 1652 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1994) (finding that
overdose of negligently prescribed medication impaired ability of bone marrow to produce
blood platelets; platelets are the component of blood that causes the blood to clot in response to
a wound or cut), cited in Tuohey, supra note 97, at 696-98.
99. See, e.g., Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff’s “greater
than average risk” of contracting cancer, while not sufficient to constitute enhanced risk claim,
was highly probative on its claim for fear of cancer and costs of medical monitoring).  Gideon v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985) (plaintiff permitted to recover for fear
of cancer in asbestosis case when he presented evidence that he had a greater than 50% risk);
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986) (same). In Collier v. Simp-
son Paper Co., the Ninth Circuit provides a guideline for such a claim:
To establish tortious inducement of fear of contracting cancer given the absence of
physical injury or illness, appellants may only recover for fear of contracting cancer if:
1) due to appellee’s negligence, appellants were exposed to a toxic, cancer-causing sub-
stance; and 2) appellants fear cancer based on the knowledge, corroborated by reliable
medical or scientific opinion, that it is more likely than not that the appellants will de-
velop cancer in the future due to the toxic exposure.
No. 97-15101, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36334, at *11 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 1997).
100. No. 97-15101, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36334 (9th Cir. Dec. 24, 1997).
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more likely than not that the appellants will develop can-
cer in the future due to the toxic exposure.101
Oregon law is particularly generous, allowing recovery of “con-
sequential damages such as mental anguish when these damages are
caused by an ongoing interference with the use and enjoyment of the
plaintiff’s property.”102  This line of reasoning should be applied to
any migration of nuclear waste that may be detected around, on, or
near the hunting and fishing grounds of the Native American hunters
and gatherers, or under or near the homes of downwinders, so that an
action for damages for mental anguish would lie. 103
Where emotional distress stems from a threat to traditional re-
ligious practices, a civil rights action based on freedom of religion
may be possible.104 For example, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Association,105 an association of Native Americans and
the state of California sued the United States Forest Service and the
United States Department of Agriculture to contest plans to permit
timber harvesting and to construct a road in a national forest. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the portion of the trial court’s order that held
that actions to construct a road and a timber-harvesting business on
Indian religious grounds violated the Free Exercise Clause.106  How-
ever, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision and
remanded the case, finding that the First Amendment did not pre-
clude petitioners from completing a road or from permitting timber
harvesting on Indian religious grounds because those religious prac-
tices “must yield to some higher consideration.”107 The situation may
be more drastic at the Department of Energy’s Hanford site in east-
ern Washington, where soil and groundwater contamination put Na-
tive Americans at risk in their subsistence and religious use of parts of
the site. Given that physical damage is evident, this is a situation
101. Id. at *11. See also Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1993) (affirming
summary judgment against class in toxic tort case where members did not present medical and
scientific evidence that accidental exposure to toxic chemicals increased risk of future injury or
disease or that they were presently injured).
102. City of LaGrande v. Union Pac. R.R., No. 96-115-ST, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23939, (D.
Or. July 18, 1997).
103. See id.
104. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
105. Id.
106. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 764 F.2d 581, 585-86 (9th
Cir. 1985).
107. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 457.
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where emotional distress could comprise a significant portion of the
suit. 108 
4.  Medical Monitoring
Medical monitoring is a form of damages that realistically, con-
sistently and adequately addresses the needs of toxic tort victims.109
The method involves collecting and disbursing funds that enable indi-
vidual plaintiffs to receive ongoing diagnostic evaluations.110 These
evaluations are designed to detect the presence of an expo-
sure-related disease at an early stage in its development, in order to
reduce substantive treatment costs and better preservation of the vic-
tims’ health.111 Some courts enthusiastically support medical moni-
toring, while others have rejected it.112 Increased risk alone is usually
not enough to warrant medical monitoring.113 Those courts that do not
require plaintiffs to establish that future injury is reasonably certain
to occur may call for a showing that that clinical examination is medi-
cally appropriate.114
Under CERCLA itself, there is no private remedy of medical
monitoring.115 However, this does not always defeat a separate tort
cause of action. For example, the court in In re Paoli Railroad Yard
PCB Litigation116 recognized a common law cause of action for medi-
cal monitoring costs under Pennsylvania law.117
In Pritikin v. Department of Energy,118 plaintiff filed a citizen suit
against the Department of Energy (DOE), seeking a declaration that,
under CERCLA, DOE was required to fund a medical monitoring
108. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1202 (6th Cir. 1988) (awarding
damages for post-traumatic stress disorder and emotional suffering as a major item of damages).
109. See Lisa Heinzerling & Cameron Powers Hoffman, Toxic Torts: Issues of Mass Litiga-
tion, Case Management, and Ethics Articles, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 74
(2001).
110. Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 311 (N.J. 1987)
111. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 821 (Cal. 1993).
112. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prod. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61 (S.D. N.Y. 2002); cf. Hinton ex
rel. Hinton v. Monsanto Co., 813 So. 2d 827 (Ala. 2001).
113. See Plummer v. Abbott Labs., 568 F. Supp. 920 (D.R.I. 1983); Betts v. Manville Injury
Pers. Trust, 588 N.E.2d 1193, 1218 (Ill. 1992); Morrissy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 N.E.2d 1369, 1376
(Ill. 1979).
114. See, e.g., Miranda v. Shell Oil Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 623, 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); In re
Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d Cir. 1990);Werlein v. United States, 746 F.
Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated in part by 793 F. Supp. 898, 904-05 (1992).
115. Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1533-35 (10th Cir. 1992).
116. 916 F.2d 829, 851 (3d. Cir. 1990).
117. Id.
118. 254 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2001).
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program to screen the population near the Hanford Nuclear Reserva-
tion. While the claim was cognizable, the court determined that it
lacked jurisdiction because plaintiff did not have constitutional
standing to compel defendant to make budget requests and to repro-
gram existing funds for the medical monitoring program.119 Plaintiff
needed to show that defendant’s failure to do so was the cause of the
injury she sought to redress.120
5.  Nuisance
Nuisance, an annoyance which is offensive or endangers one’s
health or life or disallows the reasonable use and enjoyment of prop-
erty,121 has long been an ideal route to pursue a claim against a pol-
luter. Its relation to both negligence and strict liability expand the op-
portunities for damage recovery.122 Violations of applicable
environmental statutes may be a nuisance per se.123 The nuisance per
se doctrine is particularly applicable to claims in Indian Country,
since Congress has power similar to that of the states as to the regula-
tion and suppression of nuisances with respect to Indian territory un-
der its control.124 For example, federal statutes provide for a covenant
in leases of certain Indian reservation land that the lessee will not
commit or permit on leased land any act which causes a nuisance.125
6.  Trespass
Trespass126 is another common law tool that has traditionally
been used both by environmentalists against polluters127 and by Native
119. Id.
120. Id at 801.
121. See, e.g., Northern P. R. Co. v. Whalen, 149 U.S. 157 (1893); May v. Brueshaber, 466
S.E.2d 196 (Ga. 1995). To constitute nuisance, the interference with the plaintiff’s use of its
property must be both substantial and unreasonable due to the nature, duration, or extent of
interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land. See, e.g., Gussack Realty Co. v.
Xerox Corp., 224 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2000).
122. It may be an intentional invasion of the plaintiff’s interest; a negligent invasion of the
plaintiff’s interest; or an invasion in which negligence was not involved, thus it is a strict liability
nuisance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §822 (1977).
123. See Branch v. W. Petrol., Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (1982) (pollution of underground wa-
ters in violation of statute is nuisance per se; “nuisance per se is in reality just another term for
strict liability”).
124. See 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2000).
125. See id. § 416a (2000).
126. A trespass is a direct physical invasion of another’s property. One is subject to liability
for trespass regardless of whether harm resulted to another’s legally protected interest if one
intentionally enters another’s land or causes a thing or third person to do so, remains on an-
other’s land, or fails to remove from land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §158 (1977).
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Americans against invasions of their territory.128 Trespass is distin-
guishable from nuisance as it is an invasion of an interest in land re-
sulting from possession or entry onto the land.  Nuisance does not re-
quire a direct physical invasion of land to be actionable as long as an
interference with the use or enjoyment of the land occurs.129 A defen-
dant may be liable for both trespass and nuisance resulting from the
same conduct.130 In environmental litigation, a trespass action has the
advantage of broad applicability, covering subsurface trespass131 as
well as air space trespass.132
The common-law right of Native Americans against trespassers
on their land is well established.133 There are also federal statutes for-
bidding trespass on Indian lands.134  Recent private actions have also
had success.  For example, in United States v. Pend Oreille Public Util.
District No. 1, the court found that a FERC (Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission) project license did not authorize the flooding of an
127. See, e.g., Hartman v. Texaco, Inc. 937 P.2d 979 (N.M. App. 1997) (allowing damages for
a subterranean trespass to an oil well from waterflood operations in another zone); Maddy v.
Vulcan Materials, Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1990) (action for trespass for airborne
pollution where plaintiff proved actual and substantial physical harm to his property); Nieman
v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997) (landowner brought an action against the former
operator of a nuclear processing facility for continuing trespass).
128. Under federal common law, Indians can enforce their aboriginal land rights. See
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 235 (1985). Unextinguished aboriginal
title is good against third parties, if not against the Government. Thus, a tribe may sue for tres-
pass or sue to eject non-Indian possessors. See United States v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543
F.2d 676, 699 (9th Cir. 1976) (declaring railroad right of way invalid after ninety years).  See
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral Co., 503 F.2d 336, 337-38 (10th Cir. 1974) (finding
right to sue in trespass is itself possessory right, and refusing to draw distinction between eject-
ment and trespass actions). The United States may sue state entities on behalf of tribes to seek
ejectment of those entities from federally protected tribal lands and to recover damages for
trespass. U.S. v. University of New Mexico, 731 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1984).
129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821(d), cmt. d (1977).
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821(d), cmt. d (1977).
131. See, e.g., Hartman v. Texaco, Inc. 937 P.2d 979, 983 (N.M. App. 1997) (allowing dam-
ages for a subterranean trespass to an oil well from waterflood operations in another zone).
132. Maddy v. Vulcan Materials, Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1990) (airborne trespass is
recoverable with proof of injury).
133. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941). See also Fellows v. Black-
smith, 19 How. 366, 15 L.Ed. 684 (1857) (upholding trespass action on Indian land); Inupiat
Cmty. of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 680 F.2d 122, 128, 129 (right to sue for trespass is one
of rights of Indian title); United States v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676 (CA9 1976)
(damages available against railroad that failed to acquire lawful easement or right  of way over
Indian reservation); Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (D. Alaska 1973) (upholding
trespass action based on aboriginal title). See also F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 523 (1982 ed.) (“The right to protection of tribal possession through actions of ejectment,
trespass, or other similar possessory suits was affirmed early in the nation’s history”).
134. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415, 2416 (2000).
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Indian reservation and that the utility did not comply with conditions
for the taking of reservation land through inverse condemnation; thus
flooding of the land was a trespass.135  Also, in Hammond v. County of
Madera, Native Americans successfully argued that the defendant
county’s trespass resulted in increased noise, danger, pollution, and
destruction of plants used by the owners in practicing the Native
American traditions. 136
7.  Breach of Contract
Where toxic damages result from defendant’s breach of a con-
tract with the plaintiffs, plaintiffs may be awarded the full cost of res-
toration.137 The case of Mailman’s Steam Carpet Cleaning Corp. v.
Lizotte138 discusses the rationale for an award of restoration of dam-
ages in a breach of contract case involving hazardous wastes. Plaintiff
sued for breach of warranty after purchasing property that contained
hazardous wastes that had leaked from underground storage tanks. In
addressing the measure of damages, the court held:
When property has been damaged by oil or hazardous waste and
the cost of restoration exceeds the value of the property, diminu-
tion in market value is not always a satisfactory measure of tort
damages. In appropriate cases, a test of reasonableness may be im-
posed to determine if restoration of the property is a fair and rea-
sonable remedy in the circumstances. Although these principles of
tort damages are instructive, we are presented here with a breach of
contract. The contamination of Mailman’s property caused by leaks
in the oil tanks was clearly the natural consequence of the breach of
warranty. Lizotte could reasonably have contemplated that he
would be liable to Mailman for all costs related to cleanup of the oil
leakage as a probable result of the breach and that all costs would
likely exceed the fair market value of the property. Thus, even un-
der the reasonableness test described above, the cost of restoring
the property to its warranted condition is an appropriate measure
of damages.139
To the extent that many tribes have contracted to dispose of
waste on their land, the Lizotte principles may come into action.
Knowing that tribes are in difficult economic situations, the federal
government has used the concept of tribal sovereignty as an excuse
135. United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 28 F.3d 1544 (9th Cir.1994).
136. Hammond v. County of Madera,  859 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1988).
137. 616 N.E.2d 85 (Mass. 1993). For more on the topic, see also Bell v. First Columbus Nat’l
Bank, 493 So. 2d 964 (Miss. 1986); Union Oil Co. v. Bishop, 236 So. 2d 434 (Miss. 1970).
138. Lizotte, 616 N.E.2d 85.
139. Id. at 88.
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for allowing nuclear waste to gravitate toward tribal reservations.140
First, through the Nuclear Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1987
(NWPA), Congress facilitated the siting of waste on reservation
lands.141 Today Congress is content to let the market direct waste
siting; this policy naturally has led the market to the inexpensive and
politically weak lands owned by tribes.142
Title 25 U.S. Code Section 81143 requires the Secretary of the In-
terior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to approve certain con-
tracts between tribes and third parties relative to their lands, or to any
claims regarding Indian monies. The statute was enacted to protect
tribes from “improvident and unconscionable” contracts.144 As a re-
sult, any contract or agreement that does not comply with this section
cannot be upheld.145 Courts have broadly applied Section 81 and
found it to apply to contracts that do not directly pertain to tribal
land.146
In addition to contract approval, Title 25 U.S. Code Section 415
governs leasing of Indian land.147 Pursuant to this statute, the Secre-
tary of the Interior is required to review and decide whether to ap-
prove leases of trust or restricted land, whether tribally or individu-
ally owned, for public, religious, educational, recreational, residential
or business purposes, including the development or utilization of
natural resources.148
Title 25 U.S. Code Chapter 12 details other provisions that re-
quire the Secretary of the Interior to review and decide whether to
140. See Charles K. Johnson, A Sovereignty of Convenience: Native American Sovereignty
and the United States Government’s Plan for Radioactive Waste on Indian Land, 9 ST. JOHN’S J.
LEGAL COMMENT 589, 596 (1994).
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10,101, 10,226 (2000).
142. Louis G. Leonard, Comment Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Environmental Jus-
tice in the Mescalero Apache’s Decision to Store Nuclear Waste, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
651, 659 (1997).
143. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (2000).
144. In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222 (1893).
145. Green v. Menominee Tribe of Indians, 47 Ct. Cl. 281 (1912), aff’d, 233 U.S. 558 (1914)
(holding contracts not approved by the DOI are void). Federal approval of contracts and leases
on trust property, however, are not required for tribes doing business as a corporation chartered
under 25 U.S.C. § 477 as long as the term does not exceed 25 years. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).
146. See Naragansett Indian Tribe v. Ribo Inc., 686 F. Supp. 48 (D. R.I. 1988) (holding DOI
contract approval applies to promissory notes and real estate mortgages between tribes and
lenders); Barona Group of Capitan Grande Band of Mission Indians v. Am. Mgmt. & Amuse-
ment, Inc. 840 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.1987) (holding bingo management contract relative to Indian
lands, and thus void because it did not bear the BIA’s or DOI’s approval).
147. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (2000).
148. Id. § 415(a).
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approve contracts or leases for mining, farming, grazing, oil and gas
exploration, and timber harvesting.149 These provisions effectively al-
low tribes to put an end to polluting operations on their land that
were never approved by the federal government. Because the BIA
acts as a fiduciary in approving agreements,150 it is also possible to
bring an action for breach of fiduciary duty if the agency negligently
approves a lease.151
IV.  METHOD OF PURSUING CLAIMS AS A STATE
Whether its claim is based on a federal environmental statute or
a common law tort, a state may sue companies directly for damages to
their natural resources.  The common law doctrine of parens patriae is
a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign inter-
ests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people, interstate wa-
ter rights, and the general economy of the state.152 This doctrine al-
lows the government to bring suit if it can articulate an interest apart
from the interests of particular private parties.153 Where a government
is able to assert a valid quasi-sovereign interest in a damaged re-
source, whether publicly or privately owned, it can pursue suit for
natural resource damages under the parens patriae doctrine.154
The doctrine can be used in instances where private individuals
cannot bring suits for natural resource damages against the owners of
privately-held lands. This is the case in CERCLA, where a state or
federal trustee is the only entity that can bring actions on behalf of
the state and its citizens.155
149. See id. §§ 396-401 (governing leases for farming, grazing, oil and gas exploration, and
mining); id. §§ 406-407 (governing lease for timber harvesting).
150. See Coomes v. Adkinson, 414 F. Supp. 975 (D. S.D. 1976) (holding that the BIA would
be held to fiduciary standards when the court reviewed the BIA’s decision to reject lease bids on
six grazing units).
151. See Cheyenne Arapaho Tribes of Ok. v. United States, 966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992)
(where BIA had approved oil and gas leases on tribal lands, the Tenth Circuit held that the BIA
breached its fiduciary duty, as a representative of the DOI, because prevailing market and eco-
nomic conditions were not examined before approving the lease).
152. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1991).
153. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982). See
also Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 396 (1938).
154. See, e.g., Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973); Puerto Rico v. S.S.
Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D. P.R. 1978); Idaho v. S. Refrig. Transp. Inc., No. 88-1279,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1869 (D. Idaho 1991) (holding that Idaho had standing under CERCLA
to bring a natural resources damages claim since it had standing under traditional parens patriae
doctrine).
155. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000).
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“To obtain natural resource damages under CERCLA a trustee
must demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the parens patriae doc-
trine and the land involved.”156 A trustee must show that the state can
meet all of the common law requirements of parens patriae.157 While
traditionally parens patriae was used only as a basis for states seeking
injunctive relief, it now appears that states may recover money dam-
ages in their capacity as parens patriae.158
A line of cases has allowed parens patriae suits for natural re-
source damages (NRDs) by states.159  The public trust may be defined
broadly to encompass “natural resources . . . belonging to, managed
by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by “state
government.”160
In Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transport,161 the State sought
various remedies against defendants for damages caused by a chemi-
cal spill.  The court found that the State was the proper party to assert
both CERCLA claims and a parens patriae claim for negligence.  The
court determined that Idaho had quasi-sovereign interest in the sub-
ject matter of the litigation and an articulable interest in the well-
being of its populace, something more than allegations that it is a
nominal party, for example, in abating public nuisances, conserving
natural resources or in protection of its economy.162 The court stated:
Idaho is the trustee on behalf of the citizens of Idaho of all Idaho’s
wildlife and has technical ownership of the fish that were lost as a
result of the spill.  Idaho Code § 36-103(a).  All the members of the
public are damaged by losses of Idaho’s wildlife.  Therefore, Idaho
156. Michael A. Walker, CERCLA’S Natural Resource Damage Provisions: A Loophole for
Private Landowners?, 9 ADMIN. L.J.  AM. U. 425, 452 (1995).
157. Id.
158. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1098-1099.
159. See, e.g.., Idaho v. S. Refrigerated Transp., No. 88-1279, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1869, at
*13 - *14 (allowing state parens patriae negligence action as alternative to CERCLA claim for
damages to fish); Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (damages for harm to coastal waters
and marine life caused by oil spill); Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, States Standing to Sue
on Behalf of Citizens, 42 A.L.R. FED. 23, § 6(a) (1979) (Overview of authority relating to parens
patriae suits for natural resource damage arising from discharge of oil and other pollutants into
state waters); cf., Feather River Lumber Co. v. United States, 30 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1929)
(cost of replanting recoverable from negligent starter of fire which destroyed young growth in
public forest); Spokane Int’l Ry. Co. v. United States, 72 F.2d 440,443 (9th Cir. 1934) (allowing
action against railway company for fire damage to forest ).
160. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 650 (3d Cir. 1988)
(allowing public trustee action for damage to aquifer underlying private property).
161. S. Refrigerated Transp., 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 1869 at *13 - *14.
162. Id. at *5.
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may properly bring a parens patriae action on behalf of the citizens
of Idaho based on negligence.163
With respect to valuation of damages under CERCLA, the court
recognized three valuations: commercial, existence, and recrea-
tional.164  “Existence value of a natural resource is the value the public
places on the continuing existence of that natural resource, whether
or not they will ever use the resource.”165  The State offered a survey-
ing technique, which the court found to be too speculative.166  The
commercial value was defined as the market price or exchange value
of the resource.167  Finally, the court determined that recreational
value is the value the consumer places on the use of that natural re-
source, for example, the value placed on a hunting trip.168
In Maine v. M/V Tamano,169 the State and a state agency (Board
of Environmental Protection) sought to recover damages in three
categories as a result of defendant’s discharge of 100,000 gallons of oil
into the waters of one of its bays: (1) the State, in its proprietary ca-
pacity sought damage to property, such as state parks, which the State
itself owns, including the land under the waters of the marginal seas
of the State; (2) the Board, by virtue of the authority granted it by the
Maine Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act,170 sued to
recover all sums expended or to be expended by it in payment of
third-party damage claims and clean up  costs; and (3) the State in its
parens patriae capacity “as owner and/or trustee for the citizens of the
State of Maine of all of the natural resources lying in, on, over, under
and adjacent to” its coastal waters sought to recover for damage to
such waters and the marine life therein.171  The defendant disputed the
validity only of the third cause of action.  The court upheld the State’s
ability to bring its parens patriae cause of action, citing Supreme
Court cases recognizing the right of a State to sue as parens patriae to
protect its proprietary interest as well as to protect its “quasi-
sovereign” interests on behalf of its citizens.172 Finding Maine had an
163. Id.
164. Id. at *18.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. *19.
168. Id.
169. Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973).
170. 38 M.R.S.A. § 541 et seq. (1972 Supp.).
171. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1098-1099.
172. Id. at 1099-1100.  The court stated, “A quasi-sovereign interest must be an interest of
the State independent of and behind the titles of its citizens; that is, in order to maintain a par-
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independent interest in the quality and condition of its coastal waters,
marine life and other natural resources, which are separate and dis-
tinct from the interests of its individual citizens, the court denied the
defense motion to dismiss.173
V.  NATIVE AMERICANS AND NRD AUTHORITY
Native American tribes most likely have the authority to file
similar claims, and in the interest of seeking justice for the damage to
their environment, they ought to do so. The sovereignty of Native
Americans has long been recognized. It is not inconsistent with this
traditional sovereignty for a tribe to claim authority over its natural
resources. Native Americans possess “the right. . .to make their own
laws and be ruled by them.”174
As do other sovereigns, Native American tribes have regulatory
and judicial power over their people, which includes the rights to de-
fine conditions of tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations of
members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, to levy taxes, to regulate
property within the jurisdiction of the tribe, to control the conduct of
members by municipal legislation, and to administer justice. Tribes
have great control over child custody,175 hunting and fishing,176 gaming
on the reservations,177 health services,178 human remains and other sa-
cred and funerary objects,179 language use,180 educational programs,181
and other governmental powers.182
ens patriae suit, the State must show a direct interest of its own and not merely seek recovery for
the benefit of individuals who are the real parties in interest.” [Internal citations and quotations
omitted.]). Id.  at 1100.
173. Id. The Court did not address defendant’s argument that in order to maintain a parens
patriae action, a State must also show damage to its coastal waters has an adverse effect upon a
substantial part of its citizens because the court found that Maine clearly demonstrated this.  Id.
at 1101.  The court further determined that defendant’s arguments regarding speculative dam-
ages of the State were a problem of proof to be addressed at trial.  Id.
174. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
175. See Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000); Fisher v. District
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386-88 (1976) (finding that tribes retained exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
mine custody of a child when all parties were members and lived on the reservation).
176. See, e.g., Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 239 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Michigan,
471 F. Supp. 192, 280 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (finding that fishing rights are exercised by members of
the plaintiff tribes under extensive tribal regulation).
177. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
178. See Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638, 88 Stat 2203.
179. See Native American Graves and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (2000).
180. See Native American Language Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (2000).
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The Federal Government’s higher position in the hierarchy of
the federal system should not bar tribal parens patriae standing, given
that the Supreme Court has held that States have parens patriae
standing despite their relative status to the Federal Government.183
Even if tribes do not have the same parens patriae status accorded to
states, they may still have this status by virtue of being independent
sovereigns. This is consistent with the view that tribal sovereign rights
are retained from pre-contact.184  In cases where foreign countries
have brought this action in American courts,185 the state has obtained
standing by showing that its claim transcends its proprietary inter-
ests,186 as well as its citizens’ individual interests.187
Unfortunately, many courts have upheld a higher standard for
tribal parens patriae than that which other sovereigns have enjoyed.
District courts have refused parens patriae in cases such as Assinibo-
ine & Sioux Tribes v. Montana188 and Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma v.
Lujan.189 In addition, Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Texas v. Trus-
tees of the Big Sandy Independent School District190 never reached the
question of tribes’ quasi-sovereign interests, since standing was
barred because the litigation was not brought on behalf of the entire
tribal memberships. By comparison, in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico,191  the Supreme Court noted that Puerto Rico had parens
patriae standing because it was “similarly situated to a State,” as “it
has a claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court
181. See Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
93-638, 88 Stat. 2203; Tribally Controlled Schools Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat.
130; Johnson-O’Malley Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 452-57 (1994).
182. See Cami Fraser, Note, Protecting Native Americans: The Tribe as Parens Patriae, 5
MICH. J. RACE & L. 665, 677 (2000).
183. See id.
184. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 324 (1978).
185. E.g., Coordination Council for N. Am. Affairs v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 891 F. Supp.
4, 7 n.3 (D.D.C. 1995) (“foreign sovereigns are equally entitled to protect their citizens and may
claim parens patriae standing to the same extent as a state.”)
186. See Republic of Guatemala v. Tobacco Inst., Inc. (In re Tobacco/Gov’tl Health Care
Costs Litig.), 83 F. Supp. 2d 125, 134 (D. D.C. 1999) (deciding that Guatemala cannot obtain
parens patriae standing because it is only seeking to recover damages to its own treasury, which
is a proprietary interest).
187. See id. (stating that parens patriae should not be used when a more appropriate party
than the state is capable of bringing suit).
188. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Montana, 568 F. Supp. 269 (D. Mont. 1983).
189. Kickapoo Tribe of Ok. v. Lujan, 728 F. Supp. 791 (D. D.C. 1990).
190. Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of Tex. v. Tr. of the Big Sandy Ind. Sch. Dist., 817 F.
Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
191. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
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at least as strong as that of any State.”192  Applying this rationale to
Tribes, the question is therefore whether a Tribe has “at least as
strong” of “a claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests” as
States.193 As in Snapp, tribes should have a quasi-sovereign interest in
ensuring its citizens are not discriminatorily denied the benefits of the
federal system.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Environmental action in Indian Country has traditionally lagged
behind that of the rest of the United States, owing largely to a finan-
cial and political situation that has made Native Americans vulner-
able candidates for exploitation.  But as environmental conditions in
Indian Country have worsened, courts have evolved to recognize the
interest of tribes in protecting their natural resources.  Although ac-
tion in tribal courts is limited, tribes may pursue the same actions in
federal and state courts. Further, tribes are entitled to bring citizen
suits under federal environmental law. To the extent that these ac-
tions provide inadequate economic compensation to a group that has
been exploited for centuries, private actions may fill in the gaps. If the
courts recognize a state’s authority to sue for NRD (Natural Re-
sources Damages), then it follows that the same rights extend to Na-
tive American tribes, if for no other reason than their similarity to
states.  The right to pursue toxic torts under parens patriae is an in-
credible opportunity for Native American tribes to take action
against their many polluters as well as receive monetary compensa-
tion that can aid in their struggle for self-determination.
192. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 608 n.15.
193. See Fraser, supra note 182.
